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Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State:
Transnational Democracy and/or Alternative
Legitimation Strategies?
JOST DELBROCK*
INTRODUCTION

The question of the legitimacy of exercising public authority, or more
precisely, the legitimacy of governance or government, has been discussed
since ancient times. There is a formidable host of literature on the topic,
written by philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, and-last but not
least-legal scholars. Not surprisingly, the debate over the meaning and the
theoretical foundation of the concept of legitimacy has been, and still is, quite
controversial. 1 Furthermore, the meaning of legitimacy in the exercise of public
authority and its foundation has changed with changing social and political
2
conditions over time. To mention but a few important changes: legitimacy of
the rule of kings and princes in the medieval feudal order had a different
meaning from the legitimacy of kings or princes after the emergence of the
modem territorial state; and even greater changes occurred in the post-French
Revolution era and the late nineteenth century under the impact of legal
positivism, when metajuridical foundations of the legitimacy of public authority
became no longer acceptable.3 In our time, dealing with the problem of the
legitimacy of public authority has become additionally complicated because
under the impact of globalization-understood as a process of
denationalization-public authority is no longer exclusively exercised within
clearly defined territorial entities, i.e. within the sovereign states. Rather, the
"production of public goods" or the performance of hitherto genuinely state
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Christian-Albrechts-Universitat, Kiel, Germany; Professor of Law, Indiana
University School of Law, Bloomington; Faculty Editor, INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES.
1. For a comprehensive account of the divergent approaches to conceptualizing legitimacy, see Thomas
Wortenberger, Legitimitat, Legalitlat, in 3 GESCHICHTLICHE GRUNDBEGRIFFE: HISTORISCHES LEXIKON ZUR
POLITISCH-SOZIALEN SPRACHE IN DEUTSCHLAND [BASIC CONCEPTS IN HISTORY: HISTORICAL DICTIONARY
ON THE POLITICAL-SOCIAL LANGUAGE INGERMANY] 677-740 (Otto Brunner et al. eds., 1982).

2. Id. at 677-78.
3. The rejection ofmetajuridical legitimation of public authority in the writings of legal scholars as well as
political scientists in Europe applied in constitutional monarchies and republican, democratic states alike. See
ANNE PETERS, ELEMENTE EINER THEORIE DER VERFASSUNG EUROPAS [ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF THE
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION] 506-15 (2001).
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tasks, like external security and economic and social welfare, has been shifted,
in part, to international and sometimes supranational non-state entities that are

constituted by states, but have their own legal status and capacity to act
alongside the states.4 In other words, we are facing a multilayered system of
governance 5 in which public functions are performed by states (including
internationally active substate units like member states of a federal state, or
even local communities6 ) and by international and supranational organizations,
supplemented by the increasingly important activities of non-governmental
organizations that participate in international decision- and law-making and in
the enforcement of international law.7 The challenge posed by these
developments with regard to the legitimacy of the exercise of public authority is
all the greater because we cannot simply transfer the traditional strategies of
legitimizing public authority to the transnational entities that wield public
authority within the multilayered system of governance. A simple transfer is
impossible because the traditional concepts of legitimacy, particularly those
developed since the establishment of the Westphalian state system, are almost
inherently state-centered. The result is that in the present debate over the
4. From an international legal perspective the position that international governmental organizations
possess legal status and the capacity to act under international law is undisputed today. In international
relations theory, however, adherents to the realist or neo-realist school reject that view by maintaining that
these organizations are nothing but instruments in the hands of the powerful nations to pursue their national
power interests. See WERNER LINK, DIE NEUORDNUNG DER WELTPOLITIK: GRUNDPROBLEME GLOBALER
POLITIK AN DER SCHWELLE ZUM 21. JAHRHUNDERT [THE NEW WORLD ORDER: BASIC PROBLEMS OF
GLOBAL POLITICS AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY] 108, 114 (1998). See also HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1960) (the founder of
the "realist school"); Hans J. Morganthau, PoliticalLimitationsofthe United Nations, in LAW AND POLITICS
IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY, 143, 150 (George A. Lipsky ed., 1953)("There is no such thing as the policy of

an organization, international or domestic, apart from the policy of its most influential member ormembers.")
For a critique of the realist stance, see KLAUS DICKE, EFFIZIENZ UND EFFEKTIVITAT INTERNATIONALER
ORGANISATIONEN:

DARSTELLUNG UND KRITISCHE ANALYSE

EINES TOPOS IM REFORMPROZE,

DER

VEREINTEN NATIONEN [EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS: ELABORATION AND CRITIQUE OF A TOPOS
WITHIN THE REFORM PROCESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS] 340-45 (1994); Volker Rittberger, Theory of
InternationalOrganizations, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE 760, 763 (Ruidiger

Wolfrum ed., 1995).
5. DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER,

234-35

(1995) (speaking of a transnational,

common structure of political action, "a global and divided authority system-a system of diverse and
overlapping power centres, shaped and delimited by democratic law."); see also PETERS, supranote 3, at 18789 (regarding the EU/EC as a multilevel system).
6. See Alfred C. Aman Jr., The GlobalizingState: A Future-OrientedPerspectiveon the Public/Private
Distinction,Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769, 837-70 (1998).
7. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 23-24, 184 (1995);
SONJA RIEDINGER, DIE ROLLE NICHTSTAATLICHER ORGANISATIONEN BEI DER ENTWICKLUNG UND
DURCHSETZUNG INTERNATIONALEN UMWELTRECHTS [THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] 218-78 (2001).
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"democratic deficit" of the European Union/European Community (EU/EC),
there are vociferous critics who simply deny the possibility of a genuinely
democratic legitimation of this supranational public authority. The critics argue
that the EU/EC lacks a homogeneous nation, on the one hand, and statehood,
on the other hand. In short, this position denies the possibility of transnational
democracy a limine. To reject this position as dogmatist does not mean to deny
that there are indeed serious theoretical, but also mostly practical, problems to
be solved in order to realize transnational democracy. We shall come to that
8
shortly.
The fact that, in the search for strategies to strengthen the legitimacy of the
exercise of public authority, beyond the state, democratization of the inter- and
supranational institutions has so far received the most attention must not make
us lose sight of the fact that there are other approaches to legitimizing acts of
public authorities. Some of these are related to the concept of democracy or,
depending on how democracy is defined, 9 are an essential part of democracy,
like transparency and accountability. Others are independent of democracy, but
nevertheless relevant means to establish legitimacy. Thus, the paper will
proceed as follows. Part I provides a concise overview of the development of
the concept of legitimacy and its present understanding. Part II will deal first
with the issue of transnational democracy as a means to legitimize the exercise
of public authority beyond the state, and then with alternative strategies or
approaches to the legitimation of transnational public authority. A concluding
section will argue that both transnational democracy (or at least elements of it)
and alternative approaches are necessary gradualist and reformist ways of
coping with the problem of legitimizing the increasingly important and
effective exercise of public authority beyond the state.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND MEANING OF THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY

Within the framework of the present paper, it is neither possible nor
necessary to deal extensively with the late Roman and medieval concepts of
"legitimus" from which the concept of legitimacy is derived. The adjective
legitimus was used to denote the legitimate ruler, who is invested according to
the law of the land and thereby according to the will of God, in contrast to the
8. Infra Part II.B.
9. See PETERS, supranote 3, at 630-51 (for a concise review of the different concepts of democracy); see
also infra Part II.C.
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tyrant.'o It is also worth mentioning that medieval thought did not recognize a
distinction between "legality" and "legitimacy," terms that did not emerge until
the early modem times." At that time, the term legitimus was used in two
ways. Public authority was considered legitimate as part of the moral order
which ultimately rests on God's will. Alternatively, public authority was
accepted as legitimate if the ruler was brought into office by election or
according to the hereditary order, and the exercise of public authority was
bound by positive law, resting on the consensus of the people or pursued for the
public good.' 2 In the era of absolutist monarchy, particularly in France,
legitimacy was combined with the concept of sovereignty, so that legitimacy
was defined as 'Tautorit6 Souveraine, pour se faire obrir par les peuples qui lui
sont sousmis" and as an authority "qu'elle se doit proposer pour sa fin
principale, de procurer par toutes sortes de moyens le bien de ses sujrts. '" 3
Sovereignty thus is made a constitutive element of legitimacy and thereby the
state-centeredness of legitimacy was further strengthened. During the era of
Enlightenment, legitimacy became more and more secularized. The new
understanding of legitimacy viewed its foundation as the free consent of
society. Thus, legitimacy became closely linked with the emerging idea of
democracy and the sovereignty of the people or nation. The political
philosophies of Locke, Rousseau and Kant base the legitimacy of government
on the social compact/contrat social.' 4 However, the era of Restoration after the
end of the Napoleonic Wars brought a renaissance of the religiously-oriented
legitimacy of the monarchs whose authority, according to Talleyrand,
Mettemich,15 and many-particularly German-political philosophers and legal
scholars, rested ultimately on the will of God.16 The rivalry of the democractic
and the theocratic foundation of legitimacy became the leading issue in

10. Wurtenberger, supra note 1, at 680-88.
11. Id. at 681-84.
12. Id. at 684-88 (pointing out that the latter approach was favored by rational natural law, i.e. by
Althusius, who emphasized the consent of the people and the pursuit of the bonum commune as legitimizing

elements); see also PETERS, supra note 3, at 505 (emphasizing the emerging need to provide for an explicit
justification of positive law enacted by the ruler. Justifications were argued on religious or secular bases).
13. CARDIN LE BRET, DE LA SOUVERAINETI DU ROlIl (1635); see also Wairtenberger, supranote 1,at 690
(for further references).
14. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 230-31 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DU CONTRAT SOCIAL, (Union G~n~rale D'Editions, 1963) (1762);
IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN. DAS OFFENTLICHE RECHT, §§ 43-49 (Wilhelm Weischedel ed.,

1968) (1748).
15. See WUrtenberger, supra note I, at 697-701.
16. Id. at 701-06.
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nineteenth-century Europe. The battle cries were "sovereignty rests with the
people" on the one side, and "restoration of the principle of legitimacy of the
king" on the other. Talleyrand and Metternich elevated dynastic legitimacy to
the level of the leading paradigm of the Restoration era, distinguishing between
the traditional legitimate dynasties and the illegitimate revolutionary
governments. 17
In the twentieth century and up to the present, the concept of legitimacy lost
its religious basis completely, and the understandings of legitimacy became
more diversified than ever before. It is impossible to follow all the schools of
thought and approaches to establishing the foundations of legitimate
government in the present context. Suffice it to say that legitimation of
government by the consent of the people (the democratic school) is the
dominant stance, but that positivist concepts of legitimacy are also voiced in
several variations: The legitimacy of governments cannot be derived from
external (metajuridical) sources, but is to be founded on the legal order itself
(the state as a self-referential system). Legitimacy is produced within the state
by orderly process (legitimation by procedure or by free discourse). 18 Max
Weber forwarded the idea that legitimacy of governments rests on empirically
verifiable acceptance. These are but a few examples of the diverse modem
concepts of legitimacy. With regard to Weber, it must be emphasized that the
empirical acceptance of a government by the people is not necessarily linked to
the democratic process. 19 As an empirically verifiable fact, acceptance is most
likely to be an ex post consent, although in a democratic system it may also be
an ex ante consent, as in periodic elections, which express both ex post
acceptance and also ex ante consent. 20 A third position argues that even
democratic process alone does not necessarily provide for legitimacy. It also
has to rely on external value foundations, ethical standards expressed in the
21
constitution that are to guide the political process.
17. PETERS, supra note 3, at 505.
18. See id. at 505-17 (for a concise overview and critical analysis of the positivist schools of thought). See
also Hasso Hofmann, Legalitit, Legitimitiit[Legality and Legitimacy], in 5 HISTORISCHES WORTERBUCH
DER PHILOSOPHIE [HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY] 163 (Joachim Ritter & Karlfried GrUnder eds.,

1980); Wurtenberger, supra note 1, at 734-40.
19. See Weber's pure types of legitimate government: rational, traditional, charismatic legitimation. Max
Weber, Grundriss der SozialOkonomik [Basic Concepts of Social Economics], in III ABTEILUNG:
WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFf [ECONOMY AND SOCIETY], 19 (2nd ed., 1947); see also PETERS, supra

note 3, at 514.
20. See PETERS, supra note 3, at 524-79 (for a fuller analysis of ex ante and expost legitimation).
21. See id. at 515-24 (for a full account and explication of this ethically founded concept of legitimacy).
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In addition to these quite thoroughly developed conceptualizations of the
legitimacy of governments, we find several elements and criteria that are held to
contribute to the legitimacy of the exercise of public authority. As mentioned
earlier, such criteria are transparency and efficiency of government (or more
broadly, public authority),
and actions
and accountability
of
governments/public authorities. While transparency and accountability are
clearly democracy-related, efficiency is not necessarily so. Finally, we may add
expertise as a factor that can contribute to the acceptability of acts of public
authorities. In passing, it may be mentioned that, particularly in Germany,
efficiency has a negative ring, both for historical reasons (the alleged
"efficiency" of the Third Reich) and due to an aversion to "technocracy"
(viz.
the EU/EC). However, anyone who closely follows the sentiments of citizens
must be aware that the lack of efficiency on the part of public authorities is a
major source of discontent22 -open in democratic systems and clandestine in
closed societies.
II. TRANSNATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES OF
LEGITIMATION OF THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BEYOND THE
STATE

A. Why Is There a Need for LegitimatingPublic Authority Beyond the
State?
Before going into details, it is necessary to establish why the question ofthe
legitimacy of exercising public authority beyond the state is relevant, and to
what extent. With regard to supranational organizations like the EU/EC, the
answer can be short. The EU/EC, as the most advanced supranational
institution, exercises public authority that is established by international treaties
that, in turn, constitute the constitutional structure establishing legislative,
executive, and judicial functions. The EU/EC acts through these organs, in
many instances with immediate binding effects on the member states and EU
citizens-the latter effects even entailing restrictions on the enjoyment of
fundamental rights. There can be no question that the EU/EC exercises public
authority within an institutional structure and legal order that is distinct from
the legal orders of the member states, and therefore that it needs justification in

22. See id. at 500-05 (on the crisis in acceptance of the EU/EC).
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order to be accepted as legitimate.2 3 Hence the intensive debate over the need
for the democratization of the EU/EC that, in fact, has made some progress over
the years.
The case is less evident with regard to the actions of international
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs, NGOs). At first
glance, it seems doubtful whether such organizations wield public authority in
any meaningful sense at all. Neither type of organization has immediate
jurisdiction over individuals, be they natural or juridical persons. In addition,
according to realists and neo-realists-as they untiringly emphasizeinternational governmental organizations are but instruments in the hands of the
member states, particularly the great powers.24 Therefore, there appears to be
no place for legitimation considerations. However, this is legally and factually
false. Even accepting that in highly politicized IGOs like the United Nations
power politics play an important role (much to the detriment of the authority of
the UN), 25 many other important IGOs, though not free of political power plays
in the national interest, pursue their public tasks based on their functions and
powers quite effectively. Especially where their bureaucracy is well equipped
with expert staff-as is the case with the ILO, WHO, IIMF and WTO or
ICAO-many IGOs' policy and decisionmaking is effective and has a
considerable impact not only on the member states and their internal legal
order, but also to a large extent, albeit indirectly, on the people. Thus, domestic
labor law, health law, trade law, and air transport law are heavily influenced
and even shaped by the lawmaking of these IGOs.

26

In addition, one has to

realize that, in many instances, domestic law that appears to be genuinely
"homemade" is actually nothing but a rubberstamped regulation worked out at
the level of IGOs by teams of international and national administrators (civil
service). 27 This is particularly true in the case of so-called framework
23. Id.
24. See discussion supra note 4.
25. Thus, during the Cold War major conflicts between the great powers were mainly discussed-and
sometimes resolved-at summit meetings outside the framework of the United Nations. It was not until the
end of the Cold War that the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, gained political weight and
could begin to act as originally envisaged by the UN Charter. For a short assessment of the UN Security
Council's reduced role during the Cold War, see Jochen A. Frowein, UnitedNations, in IV ENCYCLOPEDIAOF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW [hereinafter EPIL] 1029, 1032 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 2000).
26. See STEPHAN HOBE, DER OFFENE VERFASSUNGSSTAAT ZWISCHEN SOUVERANITAT UND
LNTERDEPENDENZ [THE OPEN CONSTITUTIONAL STATE BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERDEPENDENCE]
248-93 (1998) (on the impact of the actions taken by such IGOs on domestic legal orders and the role of the
member states).
27. See CHRISTIAN TIETJE, INTERNATIONALISIERTES VERWALTUNGSHANDELN 288-487 (2001).
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conventions that are continuously amended according to the standards of expert
knowledge, as either Protocols to conventions, or as recommendations that in
turn are often implemented on the domestic level, through executive orders or
other regulatory means, below the level of parliamentary legislation, thereby
bypassing the national legislative process. 28 Remembering that, in this process,
environmental NGOs in particular play an increasingly important role,
democratic legitimation proper of this kind of lawmaking is scant. In sum,
there is clearly a need to think about the legitimacy of the inter-, supra-, and
29
transnational exercise of public authority.
B. Can TraditionalState-Centered Concepts of Legitimacy be Transferred
to Levels Beyond the State?
Another point to be addressed before going into detail is whether the
mostly but not exclusively state-centered legitimation concepts or strategies can
be transferred to levels beyond the state. At this juncture, we may leave aside
the case of the EU/EC, which is a much more state-like entity than any other
inter- or transnational institution-although even here, as mentioned earlier,
there are serious objections to the possibility of democratizing the EU/EC. And
it has to be admitted that the democratization of the EU/EC, as far as it has been
achieved, is still quite different from that of democratic states. To name but
one example, the EC Parliament is not elected in a genuine general election.
Rather, the elections are held, according to domestic electoral law and in
domestic precincts of very divergent size, in the various member states, which
leads to enormous differences in the weight of the individual vote. Also, there
are no European-wide political parties competing, but merely candidates ofthe
national parties. Thus, the outcome of the "domestic" European elections is
determined by domestic political issues more than by any genuinely European
ones. But the real problems arise with democratization on the inter- and/or
transnational level. Universal suffrage is out of the question for two reasons:
first, the political and socio-cultural conditions around the world are so vastly
different that organization and realization of universal elections may be a
vision, but not one realizable in the foreseeable future. Secondly, we are facing

28. See id. at 247-50, 391-92.
29. See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD 66 (1995) ("The need
for greater democracy arises out of the close linkage between legitimacy and effectiveness .... [A]s the role of
international institutions in global governance grows, the need to ensure that they are democratic also
increases.")
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a multitude of international public authorities, each needing legitimation, but to
a different degree according to their very different important tasks and
functions. Universal suffrage could not possibly cover all of these different
needs, unless a World Government is installed in their place-a vision that is
equally unrealistic and undesirable, as Kant warned more than two hundred
years ago.3 ° Of course, one may choose a more modest approach by selecting
certain important organizations for sectoral democratization. As early as the
late 1920s, Walther Schiicking proposed a second chamber for the League of
Nations that would be elected within the member states-a proposal that was
repeated in a modified form in our time by the Commission on Global
Governance in 1995.31
The upshot of these remarks is that there seems to be consensus that a
direct transfer of the concept of legitimation by democracy to the international
level is not feasible in the foreseeable future. Whether analogous forms of
legitimation can be applied, what kinds of surrogates for pure democratization
are available, and what other measures to foster legitimacy of public authorities
beyond the state could be implemented will now be discussed.
C. Models for TransnationalDemocracy
In his excellent piece "Democracy Beyond Borders? Globalization and the
Reconstruction of Democratic Theory and Politics, '32 Anthony McGrew
categorizes approaches to the problem of transnational democracy under three
major headings: "liberal-democratic internationalism" or "neighbourhood
democracy;" "radical communitarianism: demarchy;" and "cosmopolitan
democracy. '33 The main features of the liberal-democratic position are a
rejection of World Government or World Federalism and an understanding of
"global governance as a set of pluralistic arrangements by which states,
international organizations, international regimes, non-governmental
organizations, citizen movements and markets combine to regulate or govern
aspects of global affairs., 34 As McGrew observes:
30. See IMMANUEL KANT, KANT'S PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSAL 29, 40-41 (Helen

O'Brien trans., 1927).
31. See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supranote 29; Anthony McGrew, Democracy Beyond
Borders?, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER:

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION

DEBATE 405, 408 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000).
32. McGrew, supra note 31.
33. Id. at 408, 410, 413.
34. Id. at 408.
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Central to [the Commission's] proposals is a reformed United
Nations system buttressed by the strengthening, or creation, of
regional forms of international governance, such as the EU.
Through the establishment of a peoples' assembly and a
Forum of [Global] Civil Society, both associated with the UN
General Assembly, the world's peoples are to be represented

directly and indirectly in the institutions
governance.35

of global

In other words, the liberal-democratic position advocates some form of
democratically elected representation of the peoples, possibly through national
parliaments, rather than visionary universal suffrage. This proposal carries
considerable weight, particularly because it finds support in the similar models
of peoples representation on the regional level as, for instance, provided within
the EU/EC in the form of the Council of Regions, where representatives of
local governments have been given some kind of consultative status (with more
or less success). 36

The main feature of the "radical communitarianism" or "demarchy"-as a
"bottom-up" approach-is "the active participation of people in decision
making, sometimes as representatives of specific interests they themselves have,
but often too as the trustees of interests that cannot speak for themselves., 37 In
a sense, this approach appears not to differ very much from the liberaldemocratic position. But, in stark contrast to the latter, such participation by
the people or their representatives in decisionmaking is not envisaged as taking
place within the existing international institutions. Instead, "democracy and
democratic legitimacy are not to be sought in geographically-bounded entities
like nation-states, but rather in functional authorities of varying geographical
scope run by individuals selected by lot from among those with a material
interest in the issue in question. 0 8 As McGrew rightly observes, the
35. Id.
36. On the Committee of Regions (AusschuB der Regionen), see TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, March 25, 1957, arts. 263-65, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain
Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997)), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/
eccons_treatyen.pdf; THOMAS OPPERMANN, EUROPARECHT [EUROPEAN LAW] 406-09 (2nd ed. 1999);
RUDOLF STRErNZ, EUROPARECHT [EUROPEAN LAW] 340-42 (4th ed. 1999).

37. See McGrew, supra note 31, at 411 (citing J. Bumheim, Power-Trading and the Environment, 4
ENVTL. POL. 49 (1995)).

38. See McGrew, supra note 31, at 411 (citing J.S. Dryzek, Politicaland EcologicalCommunication, 4
ENVTL. POL. 13 (1995)).
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"demarchy" approach is basically "subversive of existing forms of global
governance since its objective 'is to chip away and ultimately destroy
sovereignty at all levels of social life,' ' 39 while the liberal-democratic approach
is reformist.
The "cosmopolitan democracy" approach is reformist as well, but it is
founded on a "philosophy" that differs from that of the liberal-democratic
position in that it rejects unbounded liberal individualism. As McGrew
observes, the model is underpinned by an ethic of democratic autonomy which
differs from "the self-interest of liberal individualism[,] since it refers to 'a
structural principle of self-determination where the "self' is part of the
collectivity or "majority" enabled... by the rules and procedures of democratic
life. .

.

. Hence, this form of autonomy can be referred to as "democratic

autonomy"-an entitlement.. .within the constraints of community. ' ' '4
McGrew continues, again citing Held, "[t]o achieve this, under contemporary
conditions, requires the embedding of democratic practices more deeply 'within
communities and civil associations by elaborating and reinforcing democracy
from "outside" through a network of regional and international agencies and
assemblies that cut across spatially delimited locales.,A"1 From a legal point of
view, it is of special interest that Held recognizes "the necessity for a
cosmopolitan democratic law, that is, law which transcends the particular
claims of nations and states and extends to all in the 'universal community. ,A2
This fully conforms with the Weltinnenrecht's concept of a World Law 43 that is
constituted by traditional international law but is at least partially transformed
into a law that extends to state and non-state-actors and thus forms the
underpinning of the global community, or, in other words, coordinates and
constitutionalizes the pluralism of transnational public authorities."a
It appears that the "cosmopolitan" approach is not only quite in line with
the ongoing process of the partial transformation of international law and its
constitutionalization, but also allows for a reformist and/or gradualist
implementation of the model. The only critical point is that the "anti39. See McGrew, supra note 31, at 412 (quoting J. Burnheim, Power-Tradingand the Environment,supra
note 37, at 64).
40. See McGrew, supra note 31, at 413 (citing DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER:
FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE 156 (1995)).
41. See McGrew, supra note 31, at 413-14 (citing HELD, supra note 40, at 237).

42. HELD, supra note 40, at 228.
43. See Jost Deibruck, Prospectsfor a "World (Internal)Law? ": Legal Developments in a Changing
InternationalSystem, 9 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401 (2002).
44. See id.
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individualist" aspect is acceptable only if it is not meant as a rejection of the
indispensable protection of the individual's fundamental rights and freedoms in
favor of self-determination of the collectivity. However, it appears that what is
meant by the "anti-individualist" character of the cosmopolitan model is the
recognition that individual fundamental rights and freedoms are not absolute.
Rather their exercise is subject to ethical and constitutional restraints; that is,
they have to be used in a socially responsible manner, a position that is clearly
evidenced in the jurisprudence of, for instance, the German Constitutional
Court.45 With this proviso, the "cosmopolitan" model is commensurate with
the vision of a globalization with a human face. However, it must be admitted
that, realistically, we are at the beginning of building a global society under
law. The necessary degree of legitimation of transnational public authorities by
democratic or analogous processes is not at the doorstep. Therefore, alternative
means of legitimation, including surrogates for "real" democracy, are becoming
extremely relevant. For in the transitional period, until more transnational
democracy becomes a reality, public trust in the institutions of global
governance might decline to a degree that would render major reforms
politically impossible.
D. Surrogatesfor Democratizationand OtherAlternative Means of
Legitimation on the TransnationalLevel
As mentioned earlier, participatory surrogates for democratic legitimation
and other means of legitimation such as efficiency, transparency, accountability,
46
ex post acceptance of public acts characterized by expertise, and rationality
are discussed in this context.4

Out of the number of surrogates (delegation of

45. See BVerfGE 32, 98, at 107 (the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht)). Interpreting art. 4(1) of the Basic Law, guaranteeing the freedom of religion, the
Court first observed that "freedom of belief is not unlimited" and then continued, "The freedom guaranteed by
Art. 4 (1)
of the Basic Law, like all the fundamental rights, has as its point of departure the view of man in the
Constitution, i.e., man as a responsible personality, developing freely within the social community. These
community ties of the individual recognized by the Constitution impose formal limits on even those
fundamental rights which are guaranteed unreservedly." DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 453 (1989) (emphasis added).
46. See PETERS, supra note 3, at 517-24 (for a thorough discussion of ex ante and expost legitimation of
public authority or their constitutional basis).
47. It is a matter of definition whether the criteria of transparency and accountability are essential elements
of democracy or can also stand in their own right. If one accepts the first view then legitimation through
transparency, accountability and expost acceptance constitute a process of partial democratization. In the end,
it does not really matter which position is preferred as long as the result of the compliance with these criteria
is increased legitimacy of the public authority exercised beyond the State.
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members of national parliaments, participation of representatives of groups
particularly interested in specific subject matters dealt with on the intenational
level, and participation of NGOs), only one-the role and function of NGOs as
legitimating factors-will be taken up at this point. NGOs, widely held not to
be subjects of international law, and yet recognized as such in specific contexts
contrary to the traditionalists' view,48 are playing an ever more important role in
global governance. They are accorded a consultative status in various
international organizations, or subunits thereof, that permits them to participate
in the deliberations of such organizations. Additionally, NGOs are vested with
the right to enforce human rights by conceding to them locus standi before
international human rights courts and other monitoring bodies. They also
participate in international lawmaking processes, either as consultants or as
initiators of important international conventions (e.g. the Convention on the
prohibition of anti-personnel landmines). 49 Furthermore, they play an
important role in monitoring compliance with international conventions
promulgated in the international public interest. Last but not least, NGOs
substantially contribute to a pluralistic international public discourse, with the
NGOs envisaging themselves as advocates of the international public interest.
It is particularly this latter point that is viewed critically in many quarters,
because NGOs do not possess a democratic mandate and in many cases are not
internally democratically structured. Although NGOs offer a unique
opportunity for private individuals to participate in international political
discourse, their lack of democratic legitimacy leads to criticism. Theoretically,
this argument carries weight. However, as we are talking about "surrogates"
for pure democratic participation, from a pragmatic point of view, this
argument is not convincing. As the saying goes: it is better to have a sparrow
in your hands than a dove on the roof. There is ample evidence that a number
of NGOs have played a constructive and effective role in various settings
48. See VOLKERRECHT § 6, marginal no. 20 (Knut lpsen ed., 1999). A more differentiated positon is taken
by Karl Doehring, who rejects the notion that NGOs generally possess international legal personality but
concedes that states could accord such a (limited) status to NGOs as they did in the case of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). VOLKERRRECHT, supra, marginal nos. 196-201. For the many other

instances, in which NGOs have been accorded limited derivative international legal personality, see generally
MICHAEL HEMPEL, DIE VOLKERRECHTSSUBJEKTIVITAT
INTERNATIONALER NICHTSTAATLICHER
ORGANISATIONEN [THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS] (1999).
49. See LoP, F. DAMROSCH ET. AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW-CASES

AND MATERIALS 513-22 (4th ed., 2001) (citing Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sep. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507
(entered into force Sep. 18, 1997)); OTTO KIMMINICH & STEPHAN HOBE, VOLKERRECHT 467 (7th ed., 2000).
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(compliance control, human rights monitoring, and implementation of
environmental law) that outweighs their internal democratic deficit.50
Furthermore, providing a stringent legal framework-as already exists in some
instances-that NGOs would have to abide by in order to be admitted as
participants in the international system could enhance their legitimacy.5 '
Efficiency has a legitimizing effect. As an example of the negative effects
of a lack of efficiency, one can point to the fate of UNESCO. When the chaotic
mismanagement in the secretariat, the waste of money, and corruption became
public, not only UNESCO itself, but international organizations in general,
suffered a major loss of reputation. 2 The decline of acceptance of the EU/EC
within the member state nations is also widely held to be due to the lack of
efficiency (similar effects can be observed within states, as well).5 3
Although transparency and accountability are closely related to the
democratic model, they are also valid as independent criteria of legitimacy.
This is certainly true with regard to the market, but it is also true for public
authorities. Governmental transactions behind closed doors are likely to cause
distrust. Of course, to some degree, there are limits to the request for
transparency, such as when rights of individual citizens to the protection of
their privacy are at stake, but this scenario is the exception rather than the rule.
And it is even less relevant on the level beyond the state. At the same time,
there are many ways by which transnational or international authorities can
promote transparency of their decisionmaking: for instance, through regular,
meaningful, understandable, and accessible reports about their plans and
activities. Furthermore, international institutions can hold more open meetings
and thereby allow for better informed media reporting, to name but a few of the
possibilities. The same applies to accountability. Of course, one may ask
"accountable vis-A-vis whom?" Here it appears to be no coincidence that
transparency and accountability are usually named together. Transparency

50. See Daniel Thuirer, The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational
Enterprises in InternationalLaw and the Changing Role of the State, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW
SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM THE TRADITIONAL STATE ORDER TOWARDS THE LAW OF THE

GLOBAL COMMUNITY 37-58 (1999) (proceedings of an International Symposium of the Kiel WaltherSchiocking-Institute of International Law, March 25-28, 1998).
51. The argument that subjecting NGOs to legal rules would deprive them of their independence and
impair their critical function is beside the point: independence does not mean a right to act within a "law free
zone."
52. See Roland Bank, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,in IV EPIL,
supra note 25, at 1093, 1097-98.
53. See PETERS, supra note 3, at 500-05 (for further references).
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entails accountability, in that public authorities beyond the state making their
transactions public can then be held accountable by the various global non-state
actors, including the media, forcing the public authorities to react constructively
are revising
to public critique. WTO and IMF are examples in point, as they
54
transparency.
greater
provide
to
processes
their decisionmaking
Finally, legitimation by expertise and rationality of actions are important
means to promote public acceptance of institutions of global governance.
Convincing the public that the actions of inter-, supra-, and transnational public
authorities are based on sound expertise and rational grounds can greatly
enhance ex-post legitimation. It has to be noted that specialized NGOs, through
their expert inputs, can play an important role in this respect as well.
CONCLUSION

The historic record shows that we have moved from the legitimation of
public authority based on one generally accepted concept-legitimacy by
metaphysical myths or the will of God-to a variety of legitimation concepts
and strategies. This diversification of legitimacy concepts clearly reflects the
increasing refinement and sophistication of governmental structures as well as
the growing social pluralism in the modernizing individual societies. The
preceding analysis has also shown that in modem state theory and practice no
catch-all concept of legitimacy is prevalent. Although an increasing number of
states adhere to democracy as the basis of legitimate government, other criteria
of legitimacy are also applied, partly concurrently, partly in competition with
one another.
It appears to be justified to postulate that, in view of the pluralism of public
authorities beyond the state, the pursuance of different concepts and strategies
of legitimation is an adequate response to the challenge of legitimizing global
public authority. From a theoretical point of view, this may be problematic, but
from a pragmatic point of view, an "all-or-nothing" approach appears to be
neither politically feasible nor in the interest of the gradual and effective
formation of legitimate global governance. The ultimate goal remains: a rule
of law-based and at least partially democratized global order of peace and
justice.
54. See Daniel C. Esty, Non-GovernmentalOrganizationsat the World Trade Organization: Cooperation,
Competition, or Exclusion, I J. INT'L ECON. L. 123 (1998); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and NonGovernmental Organizations, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 623, 640 (1992).

